South Pole 14th December 1911: Debunking the One Man Show
In my current research into the Explorer’s Mindset I’ve read many biographies, autobiographies and accounts of extraordinary people – including the legends of polar exploration. One thing I’ve decided is the historical motif of the singular and heroic explorer needs debunking. For a start, an expedition is never a one-man show but a collective enterprise. Secondly it often includes the unsung skills of indigenous people whose advice, knowledge and labour make a critical difference to the expedition “leader” and their progress, safety and success.
Let’s take a timely example - Roald Amundsen (1872- 1928), the Norwegian explorer who was the first to sail the fabled North-West Passage, one of the first to cross the Arctic by air and the first to reach the South Pole on December 14th 1911, 34 days ahead of Captain Robert Falcon Scott’s ill-fated Terra Nova expedition. Amundsen and his men planted the Norwegian flag, smoked celebratory cigars and posed for snapshots before beginning the arduous trek back to their base camp.
Amundsen, the “Last of the Vikings” as he is sometimes known, demonstrates many of the qualities I’m researching to define the Explorer’s Mindset. He lived a life of exploration in which, almost ironically, his South Pole triumph served largely as a means of fundraising to follow his real passion – the Arctic. The dramatic tale of his race against Scott is well known – what may be less familiar are valuable lessons he learned from the Inuit of northern Canada while preparing for his earlier expedition to the North-West Passage.
Finding a North-West passage – a sea route to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago had been an unattainable goal for explorers for hundreds of years and many had been lost in its pursuit. As a teenager Amundsen was fascinated by the accounts of British explorer Sir John Franklin who made three attempts. Franklin’s final voyage in 1845 in HMS Erebus and HMS Terror ended in tragedy for him and all his 129 men, becoming the worst disaster in the history of British polar exploration.
Amundsen’s North –West expedition of six men in a small fishing vessel, Gjøa, with a 13 horsepower paraffin engine departed in 1903 with the additional objective (for funding purposes) of collecting scientific data about the magnetic pole. He subsequently spent two winters (1903–04 and 1904–05) at King William Island in the harbour of what is today Gjoa Haven, Nunavut, Canada collecting data, but also learning.. At first, the small anchorage was completely deserted but soon a small group of Inuit arrived and set up camp nearby. They were Netsiliks, the most isolated of the Canadian Inuit and had never seen a white man before. Amundsen and his crew made friends, learned their language and a warm friendly relationship developed, visiting each other's camps and trading knowledge and goods. The Inuit taught the Norwegians how to make igloos, dress warmly and make their sledge runners slide at very low temperatures when the snow takes on the texture of sand. They also taught Amundsen how to drive and manage sledge dogs.
Amundsen recorded much of his new learning in his journal:
February 3, 1904: “Built an igloo this morning together with Teraiu and H. approx 14 ft. in diameter and 10 ft. high. It is a great sight to behold. It is quite remarkable to watch the Eskimos’ skilled hands at work in the snow.”
February 10, 1904: “I stopped using my old clothes, wearing only my Eskimo garb now. Both the inner garments and outer anorak hang loosely around my trousers to allow air to reach my skin. …. I think it is excellent and the only way to wear such hides if one wants to avoid sweating. Now I can move as I please. I stay warm but I never sweat.”
March 7, 1904: “Teraiu taught us to prepare the sledge runners using ice. He does this by spitting a mouthful of water into a bearskin mitten, which he then rubs along the runners. It seems the sledges run smoother using this technique. We are going to experiment with it.”
Learning new skills from these indigenous people adapted to living in the hostile environment of the Arctic was fundamental to Amundsen’s success in the race to the South Pole in 1911. Specifically:
At the time of the events, the expert view in England had been that dogs were of dubious value as a means of Antarctic transport. Scott planned to reach the pole with ponies, motors and by man hauling sledges. Much of Scott's hauling was to be done by ponies ill-suited to work on snow and ice without snow-shoes. Their relatively small hooves and large weight caused them to sink into anything other than very firm snow or ice. Ponies' coats became soaked with sweat during exertion, thus necessitating constant attention with blankets to avoid hypothermia through evaporation. Dogs in contrast do not have sweat glands—they cool themselves by panting, making them less vulnerable to the cold.
By contrast Amundsen recruited experienced dog drivers. To make the most of the dogs he paced them and deliberately kept daily mileages shorter than he need have for 75 percent of the journey and his team spent up to 16 hours a day resting. His dogs could eat seals and penguins hunted in the Antarctic while Scott's pony fodder had to be brought all the way from England in their ship. It has now been shown seal meat with the blubber attached is the ideal food for a sledge dog.
Amundsen took an entirely utilitarian approach to the use of dogs and planned from the start to have weaker animals killed to feed the other animals and the men themselves. Scott was reluctant to use dogs in this way: "One cannot calmly contemplate the murder of animals which possess such intelligence and individuality, which have frequently such endearing qualities, and which very possibly one has learnt to regard as friends and companions." Amundsen and his team had similar affection for their dogs as those expressed by Scott but they "also had agreed to shrink from nothing in order to achieve our goal".
Regarding the equipment they planned to use, Amundsen's men were used to cold climates and Amundsen deliberately included a skiing champion, Olav Bjaaland, in his party. The British were not skilled at skiing, nor interested in learning and therefore had little experience of how to adapt skis to different kinds of terrain. In the final push to the Pole, one of Scott's men, Birdie Bowers, even left his skis behind at one of the depots, forcing him to plod heavily through the snow.
The Norwegians took wolf-skin fur suits, adapted from Inuit clothing, in addition to the windproof Burberry suits they wore, made of a lighter gabardine material. Amundsen had learned from the Inuit that to reduce sweating and risk of hypothermia, clothing must be worn loosely.
Lack of good nutrition has been seen by some historians as the main reason for the British party's eventual failure. Before setting off for the Pole, the British team probably already had nutritional deficiencies. By contrast Amundsen and his men were eating fresh seal and penguin meat which, unknown to anyone at that time, contained enough vitamin C to prevent scurvy. The Norwegians had learned this from the Inuit who ate an almost exclusively meat diet. The British palate preferred a less fishy taste and their penguin and seal meat was often overcooked, destroying the vitamin C.
So what can we take from this account into our own experience? In my view there is a lesson here for the first and critical stage of an expedition – planning.
Amundsen gained hugely from living with the Inuit, spending time with them and being open to a people very different from himself. He formed warm and respectful relationships, valued their culture and acknowledged their skills and “technology” as superior to his own. Although a man of his time - he was extraordinarily open minded for his day – perhaps for any day.
To me Amundsen’s experience with the Inuit of the Arctic suggests in building our own Explorer’s Mindset we should actively seek out and spend time with subject matter experts, mavens, doyens, academics and even passionate enthusiasts who live and thrive in the domains in which we seek to pursue our goals.
Of course survival is often dependent on meticulous and extensive preparation but it seems to me chances of success are accelerated when that preparation is truly diverse and outward facing.
Amundsen put it like this:
"I may say this is the greatest factor—the way in which the expedition is equipped—the way in which every difficulty is foreseen, and precautions taken for meeting or avoiding it. Victory awaits him who has everything in order—luck, people call it. Defeat is certain for him who has neglected to take the necessary precautions in time; this is called bad luck." —from The South Pole, by Roald Amundsen.